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VARIETIES OF CRISES
AND THEIR DATES
Because this book is grounded in a quantitative and historical
analysis of crises, it is important to begin by defining exactly what
constitutes a financial crisis, as well as the methods—quantitative
where possible—by which we date its beginning and end. This chap-
ter and the two that follow lay out the basic concepts, definitions,
methodology, and approach toward data collection and analysis that
underpin our study of the historical international experience with al-
most any kind of economic crisis, be it a sovereign debt default, bank-
ing, inflation, or exchange rate crisis.
Delving into precise definitions of a crisis in an initial chap-
ter rather than simply including them in a glossary may seem some-
what tedious. But for the reader to properly interpret the sweeping
historical figures and tables that follow later in this volume, it is es-
sential to have a sense of how we delineate what constitutes a crisis
and what does not. The boundaries we draw are generally consistent
with the existing empirical economics literature, which by and large
is segmented across the various types of crises we consider (e.g., sov-
ereign debt, exchange rate). We try to highlight any cases in which 
results are conspicuously sensitive to small changes in our cutoff points
or where we are particularly concerned about clear inadequacies in the
data. This definition chapter also gives us a convenient opportunity to
expand a bit more on the variety of crises we take up in this book.
The reader should note that the crisis markers discussed in
this chapter refer to the measurement of crises within individual coun-
tries. Later on, we discuss a number of ways to think about the inter-
national dimensions of crises and their intensity and transmission,
culminating in our definition of a global crisis in chapter 16. In addi-
tion to reporting on one country at a time, our root measures of crisis
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thresholds report on only one type of crisis at a time (e.g., exchange
rate crashes, inflation, banking crises). As we emphasize, particularly
in chapter 16, different varieties of crises tend to fall in clusters, sug-
gesting that it may be possible, in principle, to have systemic defini-
tions of crises. But for a number of reasons, we prefer to focus on the
simplest and most transparent delineation of crisis episodes, especially
because doing otherwise would make it very difficult to make broad
comparisons across countries and time. These definitions of crises are
rooted in the existing empirical literature and referenced accordingly.
We begin by discussing crises that can readily be given strict
quantitative definitions, then turn to those for which we must rely
on more qualitative and judgmental analysis. The concluding section
defines serial default and the this-time-is-different syndrome, concepts
that will recur throughout the remainder of the book.
Crises Defined by Quantitative Thresholds: 
Inflation, Currency Crashes, and Debasement
Inflation Crises
We begin by defining inflation crises, both because of their universal-
ity and long historical significance and because of the relative simplic-
ity and clarity with which they can be identified. Because we are
interested in cataloging the extent of default (through inflating debt
away) and not only its frequency, we will attempt to mark not only the
beginning of an inflation or currency crisis episode but its duration as
well. Many high-inflation spells can best be described as chronic—last-
ing many years, sometimes dissipating and sometimes plateauing at an
intermediate level before exploding. A number of studies, including
our own earlier work on classifying post–World War II exchange rate
arrangements, use a twelve-month inflation threshold of 40 percent or
higher as the mark of a high-inflation episode. Of course, one can ar-
gue that the effects of inflation are pernicious at much lower levels of
inflation, say 10 percent, but the costs of sustained moderate inflation
are not well established either theoretically or empirically. In our ear-
lier work on the post–World War II era, we chose a 40 percent cutoff
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because there is a fairly broad consensus that such levels are pernicious;
we discuss general inflation trends and lower peaks where significant.
Hyperinflations—inflation rates of 40 percent per month—are of mod-
ern vintage. As we will see in chapter 12 on inflation crises (especially
in table 12.3), Hungary in 1946 (Zimbabwe’s recent experience not-
withstanding) holds the record in our sample.
For the pre–World War I period, however, even 40 percent per
annum is too high an inflation threshold, because inflation rates were
much lower then, especially before the advent of modern paper cur-
rency (often referred to as “fiat” currency because it has no intrinsic
value and is worth something only because the government declares
by fiat that other currencies are not legal tender in domestic trans-
actions). The median inflation rates before World War I were well be-
low those of the more recent period: 0.5 percent per annum for 1500–
1799 and 0.71 percent for 1800–1913, in contrast with 5.0 percent for
1914–2006. In periods with much lower average inflation rates and lit-
tle expectation of high inflation, much lower inflation rates could be
quite shocking and traumatic to an economy—and therefore consid-
ered crises.1 Thus, in this book, in order to meaningfully incorporate
earlier periods, we adopt an inflation crisis threshold of 20 percent per
annum. At most of the main points at which we believe there were in-
flation crises, our main assertions appear to be reasonably robust rela-
tive to our choice of threshold; for example, our assertion that there
was a crisis at any given point would stand up had we defined inflation
crises using a lower threshold of, say, 15 percent, or a higher threshold
of, say, 25 percent. Of course, given that we are making most of our
data set available online, readers are free to set their own threshold for
inflation or for other quantitative crisis benchmarks.
Currency Crashes
In order to date currency crashes, we follow a variant of an approach
introduced by Jeffrey Frankel and Andrew Rose, who focus exclu-
sively on large exchange rate depreciations and set their basic thresh-
old (subject to some caveats) as 25 percent per annum.2 This
definition is the most parsimonious, for it does not rely on other vari-
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ables such as reserve losses (data governments often guard jealously
—sometimes long delaying their publication) and interest rate hikes
(which are not terribly meaningful in financial systems under very
heavy government control, which was in fact the case for most coun-
tries until relatively recently). As with inflation, the 25 percent
threshold that one might apply to data from the period after World
War II—at least to define a severe exchange rate crisis—would be too
high for the earlier period, when much smaller movements consti-
tuted huge surprises and were therefore extremely disruptive. There-
fore, we define as a currency crash an annual depreciation in excess
of 15 percent. Mirroring our treatment of inflation episodes, we are
concerned here not only with the dating of the initial crash (as in
Frankel and Rose as well as Kaminsky and Reinhart) but with the full
period in which annual depreciations exceeded the threshold.3 It is
hardly surprising that the largest crashes shown in table 1.1 are sim-
ilar in timing and order of magnitude to the profile for inflation crises.
The “honor” of the record currency crash, however, goes not to Hun-
gary (as in the case of inflation) but to Greece in 1944.
Currency Debasement
The precursor of modern inflation and foreign exchange rate crises
was currency debasement during the long era in which the principal
means of exchange was metallic coins. Not surprisingly, debasements
were particularly frequent and large during wars, when drastic re-
ductions in the silver content of the currency sometimes provided
sovereigns with their most important source of financing.
In this book we also date currency “reforms” or conversions
and their magnitudes. Such conversions form a part of every hyper-
inflation episode in our sample; indeed it is not unusual to see that
there were several conversions in quick succession. For example, in
its struggle with hyperinflation, Brazil had no fewer than four currency
conversions from 1986 to 1994. When we began to work on this book,
in terms of the magnitude of a single conversion, the record holder
was China, which in 1948 had a conversion rate of three million to
one. Alas, by the time of its completion, that record was surpassed by
6
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TABLE 1.1
Defining crises: A summary of quantitative thresholds
Maximum
Crisis type Threshold Period (percent)
Inflation An annual inflation rate of 20 1500–1790 173.1
percent or higher. We 1800–1913 159.6
examine separately the 1914–2008 9.63E+26a
incidence of more extreme
cases in which inflation 
exceeds 40 percent per 
annum.
Currency An annual depreciation versus 1800–1913 275.7
crash the U.S. dollar (or the  1914–2008 3.37E+9
relevant anchor currency— 
historically the U.K. pound,  
the French franc, or the 
German DM and presently 
the euro) of 15 percent 
or more.
Currency A reduction in the metallic 1258–1799 –56.8
debasement: content of coins in 1800–1913 –55.0
Type I circulation of 5 percent
or more.
Currency A currency reform whereby a  The most extreme
debasement: new currency replaces a episode is the recent
Type II much-depreciated earlier Zimbabwean conversion
currency in circulation. at a rate of ten billion  
to one.
aIn some cases the inflation rates are so large (as in Hungary in 1946, for example) that we
are forced to use scientific notation. Thus, E+26 means that we have to add zeroes and move
the decimal point twenty-six places to the right in the 9.63 entry.
Zimbabwe with a ten-billion-to-one conversion! Conversions also
follow spells of high (but not necessarily hyper) inflation, and these
cases are also included in our list of modern debasements.
The Bursting of Asset Price Bubbles
The same quantitative methodology could be applied in dating the
bursting of asset price bubbles (equity or real estate), which are 
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commonplace in the run-up to banking crises. We discuss these crash
episodes involving equity prices in chapter 16 and leave real estate
crises for future research.4 One reason we do not tackle the issue here
is that price data for many key assets underlying financial crises, par-
ticularly housing prices, are extremely difficult to come by on a long-
term cross-country basis. However, our data set does include housing
prices for a number of both developed and emerging market coun-
tries over the past couple of decades, which we shall exploit later in
our analysis of banking crises.
Crises Defined by Events: Banking Crises 
and External and Domestic Default
In this section we describe the criteria used in this study to date bank-
ing crises, external debt crises, and domestic debt crisis counterparts,
the last of which are by far the least well documented and under-
stood. Box 1.1 provides a brief glossary to the key concepts of debt
used throughout our analysis.
Banking Crises
With regard to banking crises, our analysis stresses events. The main
reason we use this approach has to do with the lack of long-range
time series data that would allow us to date banking or financial crises
quantitatively along the lines of inflation or currency crashes. For ex-
ample, the relative price of bank stocks (or financial institutions rel-
ative to the market) would be a logical indicator to examine.
However, doing this is problematic, particularly for the earlier part of
our sample and for developing countries, where many domestic banks
do not have publicly traded equity.
Another idea would be to use changes in bank deposits to
date crises. In cases in which the beginning of a banking crisis has
been marked by bank runs and withdrawals, this indicator would
work well, for example in dating the numerous banking panics of the
8
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1800s. Often, however, banking problems arise not from the liability
side but from a protracted deterioration in asset quality, be it from a
collapse in real estate prices (as in the United States at the outset of
the 2007 subprime financial crisis) or from increased bankruptcies 
in the nonfinancial sector (as in later stages of the financial crisis of 
the late 2000s). In this case, a large increase in bankruptcies or non-
performing loans could be used to mark the onset of the crisis. Un-
fortunately, indicators of business failures and nonperforming loans
are usually available sporadically, if at all, even for the modern period
9
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BOX 1.1
Debt glossary
External debt The total debt liabilities of a country with foreign creditors,
both official (public) and private. Creditors often determine all the terms of
the debt contracts, which are normally subject to the jurisdiction of the for-
eign creditors or to international law (for multilateral credits).
Total government debt (total public debt) The total debt liabilities of a gov-
ernment with both domestic and foreign creditors. The “government” nor-
mally comprises the central administration, provincial governments, federal
governments, and all other entities that borrow with an explicit government
guarantee.
Government domestic debt All debt liabilities of a government that are is-
sued under and subject to national jurisdiction, regardless of the nationality
of the creditor or the currency denomination of the debt; therefore, it includes
government foreign-currency domestic debt, as defined below. The terms of
the debt contracts can be determined by the market or set unilaterally by the
government.
Government foreign-currency domestic debt Debt liabilities of a government
issued under national jurisdiction that are nonetheless expressed in (or linked
to) a currency different from the national currency of the country.
Central bank debt Not usually included under government debt, despite the
fact that it usually carries an implicit government guarantee. Central banks
usually issue such debt to facilitate open market operations (including steril-
ized intervention). Such debts may be denominated in either local or foreign
currency.
Copyrighted Material
in many countries. In any event, reports of nonperforming loans are
often wildly inaccurate, for banks try to hide their problems for as
long as possible and supervisory agencies often look the other way.
Given these data limitations, we mark a banking crisis by
two types of events: (1) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging,
or takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions
(as in Venezuela in 1993 or Argentina in 2001) and (2) if there are
no runs, the closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government as-
sistance of an important financial institution (or group of institu-
tions) that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for other
financial institutions (as in Thailand from 1996 to 1997). We rely on
existing studies of banking crises and on the financial press. Finan-
cial stress is almost invariably extremely great during these periods.
There are several main sources for cross-country dating of
crises. For the period after 1970, the comprehensive and well-known
studies by Caprio and Klingebiel—the most updated version of which
covers the period through 2003—are authoritative, especially in
terms of classifying banking crises into systemic versus more benign
categories. Kaminsky and Reinhart, and Jácome (the latter for Latin
America), round out the sources.5 In addition, we draw on many
country-specific studies that pick up episodes of banking crisis not
covered by the multicountry literature; these country-specific studies
make an important contribution to this chronology.6 A summary dis-
cussion of the limitations of this event-based dating approach is pre-
sented in table 1.2. The years in which the banking crises began are
listed in appendixes A.3 and A.4 (for most early episodes it is diffi-
cult to ascertain exactly how long the crisis lasted).
External Debt Crises
External debt crises involve outright default on a government’s ex-
ternal debt obligations—that is, a default on a payment to creditors
of a loan issued under another country’s jurisdiction, typically (but
not always) denominated in a foreign currency, and typically held
mostly by foreign creditors. Argentina holds the record for the largest
default; in 2001 it defaulted on more than $95 billion in external
10
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TABLE 1.2
Defining crises by events: A summary
Type of crisis Definition and/or criteria Comments
Banking crisis We mark a banking crisis by two  This approach to dating the
Type I: types of events: (1) bank runs beginning of banking crises is
systemic that lead to the closure, merging, not without drawbacks. It
(severe) or takeover by the public sector could date crises too late,
Type II: of one or more financial institu- because the financial problems
financial tions and (2) if there are no usually begin well before a
distress runs, the closure, merging, take- bank is finally closed or
(milder) over, or large-scale government merged; it could also date crises
assistance of an important too early, because the worst of a 
financial institution (or group of crisis may come later. Unlike in
institutions) that marks the start the case of external debt crises
of a string of similar outcomes for (see below), which have well-
other financial institutions. defined closure dates, it is often
difficult or impossible to
accurately pinpoint the year in
which the crisis ended.
Debt crisis A sovereign default is defined as  Although the time of default is
External the failure of a government to accurately classified as a crisis
meet a principal or interest year, in a large number of cases
payment on the due date (or the final resolution with the
within the specified grace creditors (if it ever did take
period). These episodes include place) seems indeterminate. 
instances in which rescheduled For this reason we also work 
debt is ultimately extinguished with a crisis dummy that picks
in terms less favorable than the up only the first year.
original obligation.
Domestic The definition given above for an There is at best some partial 
external debt crisis applies. In documentation of recent
addition, domestic debt crises defaults on domestic debt 
have involved the freezing of provided by Standard and 
bank deposits and/or forcible Poor’s. Historically, it is very
conversions of such deposits from difficult to date these episodes, 
dollars to local currency. and in many cases (such as
those of banking crises) it is
impossible to ascertain the date
of the final resolution.
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debt. In the case of Argentina, the default was managed by reducing
and stretching out interest payments. Sometimes countries repudiate
the debt outright, as in the case of Mexico in 1867, when more than
$100 million worth of peso debt issued by Emperor Maximilian was
repudiated by the Juarez government. More typically, though, the
government restructures debt on terms less favorable to the lender
than were those in the original contract (for instance, India’s little-
known external restructurings in 1958–1972).
External defaults have received considerable attention in the 
academic literature from leading modern-day economic historians,
such as Michael Bordo, Barry Eichengreen, Marc Flandreau, Peter
Lindert, John Morton, and Alan Taylor.7 Relative to early banking
crises (not to mention domestic debt crises, which have been all but
ignored in the literature), much is known about the causes and con-
sequences of these rather dramatic episodes. The dates of sovereign
defaults and restructurings are those listed and discussed in chapter
6. For the period after 1824, the majority of dates come from several
Standard and Poor’s studies listed in the data appendixes. However,
these are incomplete, missing numerous postwar restructurings and
early defaults, so this source has been supplemented with additional
information.8
Although external default dates are, by and large, clearly de-
fined and far less contentious than, say, the dates of banking crises
(for which the end is often unclear), some judgment calls are still re-
quired, as we discuss in chapter 8. For example, in cataloging the
number of times a country has defaulted, we generally categorize any
default that occurs two years or less after a previous default as part of
the same episode. Finding the end date for sovereign external de-
faults, although easier than in the case of banking crises (because a
formal agreement with creditors often marks the termination), still
presents a number of issues.
Although the time of default is accurately classified as a cri-
sis year, in a large number of cases the final resolution with the cred-
itors (if it ever was achieved) seems interminable. Russia’s 1918
default following the revolution holds the record, lasting sixty-nine
years. Greece’s default in 1826 shut it out of international capital
12
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markets for fifty-three consecutive years, and Honduras’s 1873 de-
fault had a comparable duration.9 Of course, looking at the full de-
fault episode is useful for characterizing borrowing or default cycles,
calculating “hazard” rates, and so on. But it is hardly credible that a
spell of fifty-three years could be considered a crisis—even if those
years were not exactly prosperous. Thus, in addition to constructing
the country-specific dummy variables to cover the entire episode, we
have employed two other qualitative variables aimed at encompass-
ing the core crisis period surrounding the default. The first of these
records only the year of default as a crisis, while the second creates a
seven-year window centered on the default date. The rationale is
that neither the three years that precede a default nor the three years
that follow it can be considered a “normal” or “tranquil” period. This
technique allows analysis of the behavior of various economic and fi-
nancial indicators around the crisis on a consistent basis over time
and across countries.
Domestic Debt Crises
Domestic public debt is issued under a country’s own legal jurisdic-
tion. In most countries, over most of their history, domestic debt has
been denominated in the local currency and held mainly by residents.
By the same token, the overwhelming majority of external public
debt—debt under the legal jurisdiction of foreign governments—has
been denominated in foreign currency and held by foreign residents.
Information on domestic debt crises is scarce, but not be-
cause these crises do not take place. Indeed, as we illustrate in chap-
ter 9, domestic debt crises typically occur against a backdrop of much
worse economic conditions than the average external default. Usu-
ally, however, domestic debt crises do not involve powerful external
creditors. Perhaps this may help explain why so many episodes go un-
noticed in the mainstream business and financial press and why stud-
ies of such crises are underrepresented in the academic literature. Of
course, this is not always the case. Mexico’s much-publicized near-
default in 1994–1995 certainly qualifies as a “famous” domestic de-
fault crisis, although not many observers may realize that the bulk of
13
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the problem debt was technically domestic and not external. In fact,
the government debt (in the form of tesobonos, mostly short-term
debt instruments repayable in pesos linked to the U.S. dollar), which
was on the verge of default until the country was bailed out by the
International Monetary Fund and the U.S. Treasury, was issued un-
der domestic Mexican law and therefore was part of Mexico’s do-
mestic debt. One can only speculate that if the tesobonos had not
been so widely held by nonresidents, perhaps this crisis would have
received far less attention. Since 1980, Argentina has defaulted three
times on its domestic debt. The two domestic debt defaults that co-
incided with defaults on external debt (1982 and 2001) attracted
considerable international attention. However, the large-scale 1989
default that did not involve a new default on external debt—and
therefore did not involve nonresidents—is scarcely known in the lit-
erature. The many defaults on domestic debt that occurred during
the Great Depression of the 1930s in both advanced economies and
developing ones are not terribly well documented. Even where do-
mestic defaults are documented in official volumes on debt, it is of-
ten only footnotes that refer to arrears or suspensions of payments.
Finally, some of the domestic defaults that involved the
forcible conversion of foreign currency deposits into local currency
have occurred during banking crises, hyperinflations, or a combina-
tion of the two (defaults in Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru are in this
list). Our approach to constructing categorical variables follows that
previously described for external debt default. Like banking crises
and unlike external debt defaults, for many episodes of domestic de-
fault the endpoint for the crisis is not easily established.
Other Key Concepts
Serial Default
Serial default refers to multiple sovereign defaults on external or do-
mestic public (or publicly guaranteed) debt, or both. These defaults
may occur five or fifty years apart, and they can range from whole-
14
I .  F I N A N C I A L  C R I S E S
Copyrighted Material
sale default (or repudiation) to partial default through rescheduling
(usually stretching interest payments out at more favorable terms for
the debtor). As we discuss in chapter 4, wholesale default is actually
quite rare, although it may be decades before creditors receive any
type of partial repayment.
The This-Time-Is-Different Syndrome
The essence of the this-time-is-different syndrome is simple.10 It is
rooted in the firmly held belief that financial crises are things that
happen to other people in other countries at other times; crises do
not happen to us, here and now. We are doing things better, we are
smarter, we have learned from past mistakes. The old rules of valua-
tion no longer apply. The current boom, unlike the many booms that
preceded catastrophic collapses in the past (even in our country), is
built on sound fundamentals, structural reforms, technological inno-
vation, and good policy. Or so the story goes.
In the preamble we have already provided a theoretical ra-
tionale for the this-time-is-different syndrome based on the fragility
of highly leveraged economies, in particular their vulnerability to
crises of confidence. Certainly historical examples of the this-time-
is-different syndrome are plentiful. It is not our intention to provide
a catalog of these, but examples are sprinkled throughout the book.
For example, box 1.2 exhibits a 1929 advertisement that embodies
the spirit of “this time is different” in the run-up to the Great De-
pression, and box 6.2 explores the Latin American lending boom of
the 1820s, which marked the first debt crisis for that region.
A short list of the manifestations of the syndrome over the
past century is as follows:
1. The buildup to the emerging market defaults of the 1930s
Why was this time The thinking at the time: There will never again
different? be another world war; greater political stability
and strong global growth will be sustained
indefinitely; and debt burdens in developing
countries are low.
15
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The major combatant countries in World War I had built up
enormous debts. Regions such as Latin America and Asia, which had
escaped the worst ravages of the war, appeared to have very modest
and manageable public finances. The 1920s were a period of relent-
less global optimism, not dissimilar to the five-year boom that pre-
ceded the worldwide financial crisis that began in the United States
in mid-2007. Just as global peace was an important component of the
2000s dynamic, so was the widely held view that the experience of
World War I would not soon be repeated.
BOX 1.2
The this-time-is-different syndrome on the eve of the Crash of 1929
Note: This advertisement was kindly sent to the authors by Professor Peter Lindert.
Subject index 
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New York, New York  (now the home of Chipot le Mexican Grill) 
 
Saturday Evening Post, September 14, 1929 
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In 1929, a global stock market crash marked the onset of the
Great Depression. Economic contraction slashed government re-
sources as global deflation pushed up interest rates in real terms.
What followed was the largest wave of defaults in history.
2. The debt crisis of the 1980s
Why was this time The thinking at the time: Commodity prices are
different? strong, interest rates are low, oil money is being
“recycled,” there are skilled technocrats in
government, money is being used for high-return
infrastructure investments, and bank loans are
being made instead of bond loans, as in the
interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s. With
individual banks taking up large blocks of loans,
there will be incentive for information gathering
and monitoring to ensure the monies are well
spent and the loans repaid.
After years of secular decline, the world experienced a boom
in commodity prices in the 1970s; commodity-rich Latin America
seemed destined to reap enormous profits as world growth powered
higher and higher prices for scarce material resources. Global infla-
tion in the developed world had led to a long period of anomalously
low real interest rates in rich countries’ bond markets. And last but
not least, there had been essentially no new defaults in Latin Amer-
ica for almost a generation; the last surge had occurred during the
Great Depression.
Many officials and policy economists spoke very approvingly
of the loans from Western banks to developing countries. The banks
were said to be performing an important intermediation service by
taking oil surpluses from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries and “recycling” them to developing countries. Western
banks came into the loop because they supposedly had the lending
and monitoring expertise necessary to lend en masse to Latin Amer-
ica and elsewhere, reaping handsome markups for their efforts.
17
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The 1970s buildup, like so many before it, ended in tears.
Steeply higher real interest rates combined with a collapse of global
commodity prices catalyzed Mexico’s default in August 1983, and
shortly thereafter the defaults of well over a dozen other major
emerging markets, including Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, the Philip-
pines, and Turkey. When the rich countries moved to tame inflation
in the early 1980s, steep interest rate hikes by the central banks
hugely raised the carrying costs of loans to developing countries,
which were typically indexed to short-term rates (why that should
be the case is an issue we address in the chapter on the theory of sov-
ereign debt). With the collapse of global demand, commodity prices
collapsed as well, falling by 70 percent or more from their peak in
some cases.
3. The debt crisis of the 1990s in Asia
Why was this time The thinking at the time: The region has a
different? conservative fiscal policy, stable exchange 
rates, high rates of growth and saving, and 
no remembered history of financial crises.
Asia was the darling of foreign capital during the mid-1990s.
Across the region, (1) households had exceptionally high savings
rates that the governments could rely on in the event of financial
stress, (2) governments had relatively strong fiscal positions so that
most borrowing was private, (3) currencies were quasi-pegged to the
dollar, making investments safe, and (4) it was thought that Asian
countries never have financial crises.
In the end, even a fast-growing country with sound fiscal pol-
icy is not invulnerable to shocks. One huge weakness was Asia’s ex-
change rate pegs against the dollar, which were often implicit rather
than explicit.11 These pegs left the region extremely vulnerable to a
crisis of confidence. And, starting in the summer of 1997, that is pre-
cisely what happened. Governments such as Thailand’s ultimately
suffered huge losses on foreign exchange intervention when doomed
efforts to prop up the currency failed.12 Korea, Indonesia, and Thai-
land among others were forced to go to the International Monetary
18
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Fund for gigantic bailout packages, but this was not enough to stave
off deep recessions and huge currency depreciations.
4. The debt crisis of the 1990s and early 2000s in 
Latin America
Why was this time The thinking at the time: The debts are bond 
different? debts, not bank debts. (Note how the pendulum
swings between the belief that bond debt is safer
and the belief that bank debt is safer.) With
orders of magnitude more debt holders in the case
of bonds than in the case of international banks,
countries will be much more hesitant to try to
default because renegotiation would be so difficult
(see instance 2 earlier).
During the early 1990s, international creditors poured funds
into a Latin American region that had only just emerged from a
decade of default and stagnation. The credit had been channeled
mainly through bonds rather than banks, leading some to conclude
that the debts would be invulnerable to renegotiation. By spreading
debt claims out across a wide sea of bond holders, it was claimed,
there could be no repeat of the 1980s, in which debtor countries had
successfully forced banks to reschedule (stretch out and effectively
reduce) debt repayments. Absent the possibility of renegotiation, it
would be much harder to default.
Other factors were also at work, lulling investors. Many Latin
American countries had changed from dictatorships to democracies,
“assuring greater stability.” Mexico was not a risk because of the North
American Free Trade Agreement, which came into force in January
1994. Argentina was not a risk, because it had “immutably” fixed its
exchange rate to the dollar through a currency board arrangement.
Eventually, the lending boom of the 1990s ended in a series
of financial crises, starting with Mexico’s December 1994 collapse.
What followed included Argentina’s $95 billion default, the largest
in history at that time; Brazil’s financial crises in 1998 and 2002; and
Uruguay’s default in 2002.
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5. The United States in the run-up to the financial crisis of the
late 2000s (the Second Great Contraction)
Why was this time The thinking at the time: Everything is fine 
different? because of globalization, the technology boom,
our superior financial system, our better
understanding of monetary policy, and the
phenomenon of securitized debt.
Housing prices doubled and equity prices soared, all fueled
by record borrowing from abroad. But most people thought the
United States could never have a financial crisis resembling that of
an emerging market.
The final chapters of this book chronicle the sorry tale of
what unfolded next, the most severe financial crisis since the Great
Depression and the only one since World War II that has been global
in scope. In the intervening chapters we will show that the serial 
nature of financial crises is endemic across much of the spectrum of
time and regions. Periods of prosperity (many of them long) often
end in tears.
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